Policy Brief WP6
Key Knowledge Questions
Migration Forms
Policy Briefs WP6
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Migration Forms

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These policy briefs about key knowledge questions on migration are the result of a collaboration between Work Packages 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Horizon 2020 project, CrossMigration. They are intended to introduce new policymakers to what insights existing research can offer for understanding and addressing pressing questions on the topic.

Led by MPI Europe, Work Package 1 set out to define a set of empirical questions that are at the heart of major policy decisions that European policymakers are currently facing and will face in the coming decade. These questions synthesise the key areas of interest based on consultations with over 30 policymakers at EU, national and local level and the CrossMigration research partners. These questions are forward-looking, focusing on what knowledge will be needed to inform policymaking in the field of migration in the next 5 to 10 years.

Work Packages 4-7 bring together leading experts on the themes of Migration Drivers, Migration Infrastructures, Migration Forms, and Migration Governance. They were led by Danube University Krems (DUK), the Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung (DeZIM), the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the University of Lisbon (IGOT-UL), the Centre of Migration Research Warsaw (CMR), and the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute (EUI), along with members of the IMISCOE research network:

**Migration drivers** are structural elements that have the potential to facilitate, enable, constrain, or trigger migration. Migration drivers might increase or decrease the salience of migration, the likelihood of certain migration routes, and the desirability of different destinations. The term is more encompassing than ‘migration determinants’ or ‘root causes’ of migration, which generally ignore human agency in the decision to migrate and assume a deterministic and causal relationship between one or more structural factors and migration. Migration drivers, however, affect migration directly but also, and most importantly, indirectly and in combination with other migration drivers, in complex migration driver configurations. While the migration driver environment might be the same for two individuals, different migration drivers affect them differently depending on individual characteristics.
Figure 1
Overview Work Packages

Key Migration Questions

Taxonomy of Migration Studies

WP3
Survey & Synthesis

WP4
Migration Drivers

WP5
Migration Infrastructures

WP6
Migration Forms

WP7
Migration Governance

WP8
Migration Policy Indicators

WP9
Migration Scenarios

WP10
Strategic Research Agenda

WP1 Research-Policy Dialogues

WP2 Research Network
The emerging field of migration infrastructures sheds light on the processes that occur between the decision to migrate is made and arrival in the receiving country. It primarily asks the question of how people migrate, taking the perspective of the receiving country in three different angles: First, it focuses on regular and irregular, commercial and non-commercial actors facilitating migration, including visa brokers, work recruitment agencies, marriage migration platforms, human smugglers and humanitarian organisations. Then, it looks at the logistics of migration, exploring the role of routes, transit hubs and means of transportation. Finally, it investigates how digital technologies like the internet and social media shape mobility and influence migratory pathways.

The notion of migration forms concerns the question of who migrates. Global migration forms, or flows, include regular and irregular migrants who migrate for a broad array of reasons. Different migration forms are characterized by multiple and dynamic aspects. The differences between migration forms relate to variations in migration drivers, infrastructures, policies and experiences that shape migrants’ journeys. The Migration Research Hub encompasses a research on a range of different migration forms – a specific set of migration forms are included in the database as they reflect the existing body of knowledge and focus regarding migration research on forms. While these are differentiated in a categorical manner, migration forms – and motivations – are rarely straightforward. Indeed, migration forms and flows are increasingly highlighted as mixed, as individuals’ motivations can be multiple and constantly developing throughout migration processes.

Migration governance includes, but is broader than, migration policies. While the latter refers to laws, regulations, decisions or other government directive related to migration, governance encompasses these elements as well as the factors related to decision-making processes and implementation. While the term governance is frequently used in the field of migration studies, it remains ill-defined. Definitions of governance typically focus on the observable outputs of governance processes: i) norms, rules, policies, laws and institutions that can be binding or non-binding norms and frameworks, at the global, national or subnational levels.; ii) actors, institutions and institutional mechanisms; and iii) processes or methods of decision-making and of governing processes (including implementation and monitoring) that can be formal or informal and occur at different levels (local, national, global) and among diverse actors.
We hope that you find these guides useful for navigating these key questions. For more information on the knowledge accumulation work of CrossMigration, please visit the YouTube channel to watch interviews with the authors. To find an index of knowledge and experts on migration all under one roof, be sure to visit and register at the Migration Research Hub (migrationresearch.com).
Policy relevance of migration flows and forms

Europe faces a number of societal challenges, such as technological development and increased automatisation and robotisation changing the nature of work, population ageing and lower birth rates impacting the care and welfare systems, or challenges of sustainable economic growth in the context of climate crisis (Gonzalez Vazquez et al. 2019; Luyten et al. 2019). Although international immigration is interwoven with these issues, it is not a ready answer to solve them and may instead increase existing anxieties stemming from employment restructuring and welfare security.

In last two decades, the EU has moved forward in developing a common migration agenda and more harmonised migration and asylum policies (see Table 1 below). However, rules and standards for non-humanitarian migration are still not fully harmonised. Migration policy toward third country nationals (TCNs) is a ‘shared competence/power’ of the EU, meaning that member states can develop their own policies in parallel to the EU common policy. Similarly,
the EU Qualification Directive (part of the Common European Asylum System) has not fully harmonised the asylum-granting procedures across member states yet. It leaves space for interpretation and procedural differences across states, resulting in different outcomes for the same nationalities in different EU states (Beirens 2018). This makes data on migration flows to Europe hard to compare between member states - especially when looking at reasons of admission, as discussed later.

During the ‘refugee emergency’ of 2015-2016, the EU was criticised for its lack of coordinated policymaking and a long-term vision on future of EU migration policy. This is partially the result of some member states’ resistance to unifying migration policies. The diversity in approaches to migration policy and ways of recording migration is further complicated by its separation from intra-EU mobility. While EU migration policy focuses on external migration flows to EU/EFTA countries, additional imbalances and implications for cohesive and harmonious development (in terms of welfare provision and demographic make-up) are brought by immigration from less wealthy EU countries to more prosperous regions.

Currently, 4.5% of European population are non-EU nationals and in the last years approx. 3 mln newcomers have been arriving to EU/EFTA counties annually. The question who migrants arriving to Europe are is pivotal in order to design balanced welfare systems or decide on appropriate labour market priorities across Europe. How old are incoming migrants, would they work, if yes, what skills and resources do they bring, and finally, what are their plans - to settle or to stay temporarily? This policy brief discusses European data sources designed to monitor migration flows and reflects what we can actually say about profiles of migrants arriving in Europe.

**Difficulty in measuring migration flows**

**Flows vs Stocks**

Migration flows are not easy to measure or describe. Most data sources on international migration produce statistics on migration stocks (the number of immigrants living in a country at a certain point of time) rather than flows.
Due to the lack of data on ‘real’ migration flows, social scientists have come up with ways of estimating them on the basis of migration stock data, after correcting for differences in migration definitions as well as missing data (Abel, Sander 2014; Wiśniowski et al 2013). Past projects, such as THESIM (Towards Harmonised European Statistics on International Migration, 2004-2005), IMEM (The Integrated Modelling of European Migration, 2002-2008) or MIMOSA (Migration Modelling for Statistical Analyses, 2002-2007), re-estimated migration flows across European countries.

Other techniques have also been considered and tested. A study by Statistics Netherlands, funded by European Space Agency, tried to forecast migration flows by monitoring the size and movements of people around refugee camps, based on satellite images and social media. Another study demonstrated that analysing Google Trends indices, which show the number of online searches for specific keywords in migrants’ countries of origin, can help in estimating migration flows (Böhme et al. 2019). Yet, these new methodological developments are mainly concerned with the intensity of flows, and they offer little insight into the profile of migrants.

**Data sources**

People who move to a country other than their usual residence for a period of at least 12 months are considered ‘migrants’ within major international data sources (e.g. OECD, UN). They usually break data by nationality, place of previous residence, age and sex. As such, they do not allow to describe the socioeconomic profiles of migrants, or they do not capture short-term movements and migratory forms such as temporary or circular migration. EU surveys, which have a battery of questions about immigrants’ socio-demographic profile – such as EU Labour Force Surveys (EU-LFS) or EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) – do not systematically include representative samples of immigrants. Some other European data sources and their limitations are overviewed in Table 2.

European datasets for population and immigration draw on national registers, which record more socio-demographic and economic information about migrants and country’s population as a whole. They do not separate more recent newcomers from settled migrants.

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An example of good practice is a Nordic Central Population Register (CPR), shared between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Each resident is assigned a Personal Identification Number (PIN), either at birth or on immigration to a country. The PIN number follows individual through their lives and when moving to another Nordic country (Hovde Lyngstad, Skardhamar 2011). On the one hand, CPR register data is not perfect in terms of comparability, long processing time, and still requires caution when retrieving data on education or income outcomes (Van Der Wel et al. 2019). On the other hand, migratory pathways of both European and non-European migrants might be traced across Nordic countries, as well as their corresponding change in profile.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty &amp; Tampere Council</td>
<td>With the Treaty (May), Member States transferred more legislative power on immigration and asylum to EU institutions; Tampere Council (October) called to develop common EU policies on asylum and immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)</td>
<td>The framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy, which involved implementing multiple political and legal instruments (e.g. Mobility Partnerships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The Common European Asylum System (CEAS)</td>
<td>Legislative framework aiming to harmonise procedures and protection statuses across member states, marks a major step in the EU approach to humanitarian migration (including the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualifications Directive, the Dublin Regulation, and the EURODAC regulation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>European Agenda on Migration (EAM)</td>
<td>Measures aimed at securing external borders, limiting irregular migration, modernising the Common European Asylum System, and effectively managing legal migration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EthMigSurveyData is a COST action project (see https://ethmigsurveydatahub.eu/) aiming to develop a harmonised survey data bank with surveys of ethnic minorities and migrants across Europe. Although the ‘post-harmonised’ dataset will produce more reliable data on integration of ethnic minorities and migrants (so again with a focus on the ‘stocks’ not ‘flows’). It might be worth further research whether there is a potential to build a representative subsample of more recent migrants to learn about their profiles. It is, however, likely that in many countries newcomers arriving to Europe fall outside used sampling frames for these surveys and they might not be included in harmonised data anyway.

**Migration flows to Europe**

**What does data tell us?**

Despite the ‘refugee emergency’ of 2015-2016 monopolised the media’s attention in recent years, the main forms of immigration in the past two years have been for the purpose of undertaking work and for family reasons. As depicted in the map in Figure 2, migration flows differ considerably across Member States and parts of Europe. While the most common form of migration in Western and Southern EU countries in 2018 were family and humanitarian migration, Eastern European countries – due to smaller settled migrant communities – experienced a sharper increase in work-related migration.

Poland – thanks to the special scheme for temporary workers (see next section) – is a recent frontrunner in labour migration, with the number growing by six times between 2012 and 2017 – from approx. 100 thousand to almost 600 thousand. Among the 1 mln permits issued for work purposes in 2017 across the EU, almost 60% were issued in Poland. This fell to 37% (328 thousand) in 2018. Ukrainians predominantly migrate to Poland on the basis of temporary work permits, 80% of which were issued for low-skilled jobs in 2017. Other main destinations of labour migration in Europe in 2018 were the UK, Germany, Spain and France.

Family migration is the most important reason among all migrants holding a permit in Europe. The largest number of permits for family reasons was issued in 2018 in Germany, Spain, Italy, UK, France and Spain – so-called ‘traditional’ countries of immigration in Europe. In the last five years, ‘family migration’ more than doubled in Germany from 82,000 to 190,000, while the highest relative increase was recorded in Poland – from 3.5 thousand permits to 13 thousand.

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In 2013-2015 most applications for humanitarian protection were lodged in Germany, Hungary, Sweden and Italy. More recently, growing numbers of asylum seekers have submitted applications in Greece and Spain. The main countries of origin of applicants in recent years were Syria (22% of appl. in 2014-2018), Afghanistan (11%), Iraq (8%), Pakistan (4%) and Georgia (1%).

A decade ago (2009) the four main origins of immigrants were Indian, American, Chinese and Moroccan. In last few years, Ukraine has become the main country of origin of immigrants to Europe. Immigration from China has also increased due to more education-related stays. Both sources of immigration are rather temporary, and many immigrants return to their countries of origin without settling in.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>How produced</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Eurostat ‘Asylum & Managed Migration’ | Data collected by EU/EFTA data providers: mainly Ministries of Interior or related immigration agencies | • Differences in permits issued across MS  
• Different level of implementation of EU directives  
• No socioeconomic profile |
| Eurostat Immigration Statistics | National statistics institutes: Central/ National population registers. Censuses or population estimates | • Migration defined as 12-month stay (actual or expected, varies by country)  
• Migration stocks data  
• Population by country of birth and citizenship (EU/non-EU) and employment, educational attainment |
| Eurostat Population Statistics | As above LFS Surveys | • Population employment, educational attainment etc. by country of birth and citizenship (EU/non-EU)  
• Migration stocks data |
| Frontex detection of illegal border crossings | Data supplied by EU/EFTA member states (MS) | • The same person may cross EU/EFTA external border more than once  
• No socio-demographic data |
| EU Surveys (EU-SILC, EU-LFS) | Sample surveys | • Surveys not representative for migrant populations |
What we would like to know

Political regulations influence how immigrants arriving to Europe are classified. The administrative categories to qualify the situation of migrants in Europe are based on: (a) legality of entrance and stay (according to the EU and national laws) and (b) one main reason to migrate to a country. Consequently, Eurostat’s ‘Asylum & Managed Migration’ gathers data on migration flows as fixed and static migratory categories. In this data various types of migration flows are separated on the based on their purposes, such as work, educational, family reasons, or ‘other reasons’ (which includes asylum)\(^4\). Such categories have far-reaching practical consequences: they give (or deny) access to certain resources and protection rights (Erdal, Oeppen 2018).

Meanwhile the lines between migratory forms are blurred. The permit type might not necessary correspond well with the actual and more complex motive to move. Migration for reasons to seek protection or unite with family members, for example, does not exclude holding work-related reasons too. The term ‘mixed migration’, coined a few decades ago and nowadays commonly used by UNHCR (Scheel, Ratfisch 2014), attempts to represent the complex motives and nature of migration spanning between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ motives. Yet, it has not been translated into administrative categories (see Box 1).

\(^{4}\) Such categories have far-reaching practical consequences: they give (or deny) access to certain resources and protection rights (Erdal, Oeppen 2018).
The main category of EU and national migration policies is third country nationals (TCNs) – people who are not citizens of any EU member state nor of an EFTA country (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland), and do not have the right to the freedom of movement within the EU. In the EU legal framework, citizens of EU and EFTA countries who move within EU/EFTA are not migrants, but ‘mobile’ citizens. Despite that, in many European countries, the public still regards them as migrants. This is especially true for certain minorities, for example Roma people (Yildiz, De Genova 2018) or citizens from newer EU member states. In popular use, the term ‘migrant’ is often reserved to migrants from countries regarded as less wealthy or more culturally distant, while migrants from Western countries (like Western European states, US) are characterised as ‘expats’ (Cranston 2017). Although their mobility type is technically a form of migration (and often long-term or permanent), their presence is seen as desirable, and position in opposition to other ‘migrants’ who might be less desired.

The term refugee is also used in different ways. In the light of international law, ‘asylum seekers’ are distinguished from ‘refugees’ as humanitarian migrants whose claims have not been yet evaluated. In common understanding, only persons forced to flee their country due to persecution, war or violence are considered ‘real’ refugees by definition. Fixed categorisations do not reflect the complex reality of migrants’ lives, whose status between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration is usually not clear-cut. Migrants’ motivations are often mixed, including both humanitarian and economic reasons (Robertson 2019). Some asylum seekers (and people self-identifying as refugees) might be leaving their countries as a result of economic reasons too, for example, since some professions might become forbidden due to new regimes, e.g. in Islamic-State controlled territories: barbers, photocopying, gynaecologist (Crawley, Skleparis 2018).

**Box 1**

Categories used to describe migration flows

The main category of EU and national migration policies is third country nationals (TCNs) – people who are not citizens of any EU member state nor of an EFTA country (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland), and do not have the right to the freedom of movement within the EU. In the EU legal framework, citizens of EU and EFTA countries who move within EU/EFTA are not migrants, but ‘mobile’ citizens. Despite that, in many European countries, the public still regards them as migrants. This is especially true for certain minorities, for example Roma people (Yildiz, De Genova 2018) or citizens from newer EU member states. In popular use, the term ‘migrant’ is often reserved to migrants from countries regarded as less wealthy or more culturally distant, while migrants from Western countries (like Western European states, US) are characterised as ‘expats’ (Cranston 2017). Although their mobility type is technically a form of migration (and often long-term or permanent), their presence is seen as desirable, and position in opposition to other ‘migrants’ who might be less desired.

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4 The ‘other reasons’ category includes: humanitarian migration; diplomat, consular officer treated as exempt from control; retired persons of independent means; all other passengers given limited leave to enter who are not included in any other category; non-asylum discretionary permissions.

5 While in the legal definition citizens of NO, IS, LI and CH are not TNC, in some migration statistics they are considered to be TNC, along nationals of European micro-states (Monaco, San Marino, Vatican City). See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/third-country-national_en
The socio-economic profile of migrants moving to Europe often changes drastically during their journey too. They might leave their country of origin with financial resources necessary to bring their families to a safe location, but arrive to a country of transit or destination without any resources left, and in a need of protection. Also, we do not know what permits immigrants apply for after the temporary humanitarian statuses expire. To move away from such static and binary categories, Collyer and Haas (2012: 479) suggested a term ‘fragmented migration’, so migration could be conceptualised as a “process in which people shift from one categorisation to another”. While such changes may be potentially traced at the national levels (i.e. via population registers), Eurostat data does not unpack changes in migration forms over time.

Despite these problems regarding the oversimplifying nature of used migration categories, policymakers still need some reference categories to effectively manage migration flows and to coordinate immigration policies across the EU. Recording more information on migration motive and migrant profiles, as well as their change over time and space (while they move within EU/EFTA and apply for different permits), would allow better understanding who migrants arriving to Europe are.

**Box 2**

Measuring policy impacts on migration – an impossible task?

To evaluate the effect of migration policy on migratory flows, it is necessary to establish: what counts as migration policy; what is the intended aim of policy change; and how the policy change is managed and communicated (Haas et al. 2015). Specifically:

- Migration policy may include: border control policies, labour migration policies, asylum policies, family reunification policy, integration policy, etc.
- Relevant policy tools can be: recruitment programmes, new work/residency permits, easier access to citizenship, new detention rules, or resettlement programmes.
- Effect of non-migration policies: development and aid programmes, national labour market policies (e.g. more flexible modes of employment), education policies.
- Changes of policy might be: restricting/expanding the volume and composition (profile) any migrants / specific group of migrants (origin).
- The real objectives of a new policy might be affected and even distorted by the discourse surrounding the policy change.
Policy changes and migration flows/forms

Limiting irregular migration

During the last ‘refugee emergency’ in Europe (2015-2016), EU and member countries separately have made steps to decrease the number of irregular migrants arriving to Europe. Figure 6 illustrates that in a long-term perspective (2009-2018) Eastern and Central Mediterranean migration routes have been most frequently used to cross the external EU borders unlawfully. While the intensity of migration flows can be explored, not much can be concluded at the European level about the characteristics of newcomers due to data nature.

- Shortly after signing the EU-Turkey Agreement in March 2016, accompanied by closing of North Macedonia borders, the number of irregular migration has dropped significantly in Greece (see Figure 3). However, the number of asylum seekers arriving to Greece has not fallen, although it has been rising less dynamically.

Asylum seekers who do not qualify for refugee status (Geneva Convention) or subsidiary protection (would face real risk of serious harm in case of return to country of origin) might receive temporary protection (in case of large influx of migrants). In some countries they are also allowed to stay for other humanitarian reasons (usually ill health or as unaccompanied minors).
Similarly, the Italy-Libya Agreement of July 2017 significantly diminished the inflow of migrants from Libya. At the same time Spain has become a more important immigration route; the number of asylum seekers has tripled in 2018 in comparison to 2016 (increase from 16 thousand to 54 thousand) and the number of irregular crossings reached 10 thousand per month in summer 2018, falling to 1 thousand in March 2019.

Within the Schengen area there was a number of temporary border controls was introduced to counter secondary movements of irregular migrants. For example, Sweden introduced border controls at the border with Denmark (Nov 2015-May 2017) and Denmark introduced such controls at its border with Germany (since Jan 2016). Other European countries, such as North Macedonia, Greece or Hungary temporarily closed their borders in this time.
It is hard to assess the independent effect of EU migration management efforts on changing flows. Pointing to the lack of reliable data, recent policy analysis calls into question whether the drop in the migration flows via the Western Balkan Route was actually the result of the EU-Turkey agreement (Engler 2019). There are also reservations towards the ‘shift in routes’ hypothesis, as a few migrants from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq have arrived via Italy and the Central Mediterranean Route.

**Managing forms of migration**

**Family migration**

Not all EU countries are bound by the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC; UK, Ireland and Denmark) and in some countries it is implemented differently (e.g. who can be a sponsor, sponsor type of permit, definition of family members and other dependant persons). For example, Poland – with a relatively small community of settled and long-term immigrants – does not allow to unite within partner (non-marriage) relationships, as do Portugal, Denmark and UK.

As a result, as depicted in Figure 5, the extent to which residence permits for family reasons are used varies across countries. After an increase in humanitarian migration in Sweden in 2015-2016, followed by more migration because of family reasons, the number of such applications became stable in 2017-2018 (Figure 7, graph g), which might be due to reforms in law (as discussed below).

**Humanitarian migration**

Sweden used to have one of the most generous asylum laws in the EU. In June 2016, in response to the increase in inflow of asylum seekers in 2015-2016, Sweden introduced more restrictive asylum law by reducing access to family reunification for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (Frantzke 2017). Specifically, refugees had to submit reunification claims within three months of receiving the status and after demonstrating financial sufficiency. The beneficiaries of subsidiary protection became no longer eligible to apply for family reunification as they were not granted permanent residency anymore, but temporary residency. Additionally, the status ‘otherwise in need of protection’ was not granted anymore.

**Highly skilled work migration**

The EU Blue Card (BC) initiative is a relatively new work permit for highly qualified workers introduced by the European Commission in 2007, and implemented from 2009. The Card – as any other migration policy initiative in the EU – has been implemented differently across member states. Although only UK, Ireland and Denmark opted out from the scheme, yet
it is not used in practice in majority of EU countries. In 2017, out of 24 thousand cards, 21 thousand were issued by Germany. The number of cards issued in Germany has increased since 2012 ten times from 2.6 thousand to 27 thousand in 2018.

The tool has not been yet successful in attracting more qualified migrants due to a number of issues. First, many Member States have their own national schemes for highly skilled that are more generous or more easily accessible, e.g. in terms of processing time, pathways to permanent residency and salary threshold (Triandafyllidou, Isaakyan 2014). Second, BC offers limited possibilities to TNC to move within a European labour market. Finally, the salary threshold (1.2 the average salary in the member state for a profession in shortage, and 1.5 – any other skilled profession), might be too high for workers at early career stages.

**Box 3**

Poland: from temporary to permanent migration

In 2007, Poland introduced a new employment status for selected groups of foreigners called ‘declarations of intent to employ’, also called ‘simplified procedure’. Citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia could undertake temporary employment in Poland without proper work permits: it was sufficient that an employer registered in a local job centre their intent to employ them. Currently, the law covers all EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) and refers to any work which is temporary, but not seasonal, and for up to six months in a 12-month period. In 2018, a new seasonal work permit was also introduced and available to foreigners to any nationality to undertake work for up to nine month per year (Jaroszewicz 2018).

The effect of these policy changes has been widespread. The number of declarations has been increasing, especially since 2014, from 387 thousand to 1.8 mln in 2017. In 2017, 95% of the declarations were for Ukrainian citizens, out of which 35% were issued to foreigners who already had a visa or residence permit in Poland. The number of other permits has been affected too – work permits increased from 41 thousand in 2013 to 267 thousand in 2017 (Ukrainians: increase from 21 thousand to 216 thousand), as well as more foreigners has been applying for residence permits: while in 2014 it was 80 thousand, in 2017 it more than doubled to – 192 thousand (of whom 65% were Ukrainians).
Low skilled and skilled migration
The countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 have experienced unprecedented level of emigration of their own citizens to Western Europe countries. As such, their labour markets struggle to fill in posts with low-skilled workers and semi-skilled specialists. Poland has been in recent year the largest recipient of temporary migration from Ukraine and other Eastern Europe non-EU countries (see case study in Box 3). Polish case demonstrates how the effect of policy aiming to support temporary and seasonal employment (directed to low-skilled employees) can spread across other forms of migration, resulting in more permanent forms of immigration. Similarly, in 2017-2018 Hungary has been issuing more work permits and more migrants have used family unification route to move to the country. Ukrainians also the largest migration group in Hungary (21 thousand work-related permits), followed by Serbs (3.4 thousand).

Germany has introduced a new policy called Western Balkan Regulation (2015), aiming at reducing irregular and asylum applications from Western Balkans and ‘re-routing’ them into a legal pathway. The access to German labour market for citizens of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia was liberalised (no skill/qualification requirements). In 2016-2017 over 117 thousand valid work contracts were issued, and the country recorded 90% drop of asylum applications. Yet, in this time many other measures on stopping immigrants from the region were undertaken, so the effects of this policy cannot be fully established (Bither, Ziebarth 2018).

Study migration
Almost one in third migration permits for the purpose of study was granted in the UK in 2018. The popularity of the British higher education has however declined in last decade after the higher education reform (from 270 thousand permits in 2009 to 190 thousand in 2018; especially since 2012/2013 – increase of university fees to 9 thousand GDP per annum).

The second recipient of international students in 2018 was Poland which issued almost 100 thousand permits for education reasons. It was three times more than it did annually in years 2014-2017. A few factors contribute to the popularity of Poland among international students: internationalisation

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7 Germany Skilled Worker Immigration Act (passed by German parliament on 7 June 2019, which will enter into force in March 2020) facilitates work migration of people with higher education and qualified professionals with vocational qualifications from outside EU/EFTA countries. This would replace the list with shortage of occupations (Beirens et al. 2019).

8 In 2018, 55 thousand permits were for Ukrainian students, 11 thousand – Turkish, 5 thousand for Indian and Belarussian each.
programme of Polish higher education (the programme „Study in Poland” kicked off in 2005), scholarships programmes for students with Polish descend, globally recognised standards of some disciplines (such as in science and medicine), obtaining an EU-recognised degree while studying in a country of relatively low life costs in comparison to Western Europe.
Summary

The above overview of changes testifies to difficulty in predicting migration flows and how particular migratory forms have been affected. The intensity, composition and the direction of migration flows depend on many interconnected structural factors in the countries of origin, transit or destination countries. Additionally, there might be an interplay between policies across European countries affecting the direction and intensity of flows within the region.

Main research gaps

- Limitations of international and European datasets. Main data sources on international migration produce statistics on migration stocks rather than flows, which does not allow describing the profile of newcomers arriving to Europe, but of settled migration population. There are also differences in procedures across EU/EFTA member states in granting permits, like humanitarian protection or for family reasons, which make the data less comparable. Even less is known about the profile of temporary and circular migrants. Similarly, most sample-based data sources focus on immigrant integration outcomes, not on who they are/were when arriving to Europe.

- Categorisation of migrants. Current statistical databases, like Eurostat sources, do not allow comprehensive description of migration flows by reason of entry, due to recording only one main reason of immigration. To respond to these limitations, policymakers should consider developing and using new ways of measuring and classifying migratory flows, capturing mixed nature of migratory forms. Further research could explore what mixed migration configurations would be useful for EU migration policy.

- Defragmentation of registers. European population registers are not linked (as the Nordic CPR), so migratory pathways of both EU/EFTA citizens and TCNs cannot be traced. Ultimately, various forms of intra-EU mobility and external immigration to Europe is not monitored jointly in order to anticipate their potential conjoint effects on labour markets and welfare systems.

- Managing migration. Currently, there is no clear-cut evidence that EU migration management efforts have had impact on the nature of migration flows to Europe, although it is very likely that increased border controls and treaties with neighbouring countries had an impact on limiting irregular migration and illegal border crossings. Yet, current data sources do not allow to determine the socio-economic characteristics of immigrants who managed to get to EU/EFTA countries in terms of socioeconomic profile (e.g. education, occupation, resources). As such, monitoring changes in the nature of migration flows is hardly possible.
The main EU policy frameworks on this topic

- The Common European Asylum System, which establishes common standards and promotes co-operation for a fairer and more equal asylum process across the EU (including the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualifications Directive, the Dublin Regulation, and the EUROPDAC regulation).
- The Legal Migration Directives, which set common EU standards for the conditions of entry and stay as well as other rights of specific categories of migrants (including the Family Reunification Directive, the Long-Term Residents Directive, the EU Blue Card Directive for highly skilled workers, the Single Permit Directive, the Seasonal Workers Directive, the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive, and the Students and Researchers Directive).
- The Schengen external borders acquis, which governs border control of persons crossing the EU’s external borders. Its main pillar is the Schengen Borders Code.
- The 2015 European Agenda on Migration, which includes several measures aimed at securing external borders, curbing irregular migration, modernising the Common European Asylum System, and effectively managing legal migration.

Recommendations key readings


References


Cranston, S. (2017). Expatriate as a ‘good’ migrant: Thinking through skilled international migrant categories. Population, Space and Place, 23(6), e2058.


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